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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
 
Global warming is a major issue on international political agendas regardless of the 
uncertainties and divergences still remaining on the real dimension of the problem. 
Scientific community disagreement on its true consequences for human life is even 
bigger but public opinion urges for action. Anthropogenic greenhouse gases (GHG) 
emissions became the target and its mitigation compulsory, as they are pointed as key 
responsible for the sudden and severe global climate change we are facing. Therefore, to 
choose the best policy instrument to achieve this environmental goal while minimizing 
the consequences for economies competitiveness is a crucial task.  
A huge literature exists on the centralized versus market-based environmental 
policy instruments debate. Just as well documented and discussed is the particular case 
of GHG reductions. Economists elected market based instruments as the best also for 
environmental problems a long time ago. Interestingly, among those, political option to 
deal with global warming has been the use of tradable emission permits although 
economic literature points environmental taxes as the most appropriate to deal with 
GHG emissions when environmental costs and benefits of abatement are uncertain. 
Kyoto Protocol mechanisms or the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS) illustrate the political choice. Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) or Aldy et al. (2003), 
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for example, justify why economists’ recommendation is on emissions taxes. Our work 
contribution is not, however, on the debate about this divergence between economists 
and politician choices. Abstracting from the emissions damages uncertainty (or, 
emissions abatement benefits) our key objective is to examine the functioning of the 
carbon emission permits markets with cost abatement uncertainty and several other real 
world implementation characteristics. A comprehensive description and analysis of this 
particular market mechanism allows us to fulfil one of the economists’ main 
responsibilities: to provide policy recommendations. As mentioned by Binmore e 
Klemperer (2002, pg. C95) “Our marginal product in preventing mistakes can therefore 
sometimes be surprisingly large”. 
The innovative character of emission permits market as a policy instrument to 
fight a global negative externality justifies our investigation. To be the most efficient 
environmental policy instrument, as formally proved by Montgomery (1972), this 
should be a “perfect” market. As reality has all characteristics but perfection doubts 
arise on the effective achievements that will be possible with the creation of these 
markets. This is where our paper intends to contribute: to increase knowledge about the 
real performance of emission permits markets for GHG. More specifically, we focus on 
the EU ETS and its institutional characteristics. EU ETS is one of the biggest 
environmental policy experiments ever. Its dimension, multi- jurisdictional political 
structure, connection between differing domestic emissions permits programs and 
innovative character on dealing with greenhouse gases emissions on a big scale justify 
its status. According to the World Bank Report by Capoor and Ambrosi (2008), in 2007 
the EU ETS was still the major carbon market, by far, both on volume and value. 
Therefore, enormous attention is currently placed on its performance and developments 
by those who plan to implement a similar policy. 
We decided to use the experimental methodology to pursue our goal. As pointed 
by Smith (1982), it is not possible to design a laboratory experiment about resources 
allocation without rigorously defining all the institutional rules and details. Although 
not formalized at the theoretical model describing emission permits markets these are 
characteristics that matter for its final results. Plott and Smith (1978) concluded 
“institutions do matter” and we considered laboratory experiments to be the most 
appropriate methodology to evaluate its importance on the emission permits market 
case.  
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Our experimental design intended to include as many EU ETS characteristics as 
possible without rendering the experiment too complex. Previously to the 
implementation of any emission permits market, laboratorial included, decisions must 
be made on its market rules: 
i) whether to allow emission permits intertemporal usage (banking current 
permits for future use and/ or borrowing permits for future periods and 
use them at present); 
ii) emission reductions basis definition (absolute reference –cap-and-trade 
system – or relative reference – baseline-and-credit system); 
iii)  the initial allocation method (free allocation - grandfathering – or 
auctioning); 
iv) transaction rules between firms (bilateral transactions, double auctions, 
or others);  
v) equilibrium price rule (unique price, discriminative price, first rejected or 
last accepted price). 
 
On what concerns the rules pointed above, our experimental design respected the 
European Commission choices for the EU ETS implicit at the 2003/87/EC Directive: a 
cap-and-trade system with grandfathering of emission permits and banking but not 
borrowing. Although over-the-counter transactions of CO2 emission permits represented 
a great share on the EU ETS, our experimental design reflects the functioning and 
transactions made on the exchanges: double auction with discriminative prices.  
Laboratory experiments to study emission permits markets were used by Godby 
et al. (1997), Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse (1999a), Franciosi et al. (1999), Cason et al. 
(1999), Mestelman et al. (1999) and Gangadharan et al. (2005), just to name a few. 
Therefore, our experiments may be considered a development on those that already 
exist about this policy instrument. However, if American or Canadian markets were 
considered by many, the European case has still a long way to go. Benz and Ehrhart 
(2007) experimental study on EU ETS, for instance, is far from being an EU ETS 
testbeding. To our knowledge, the present work is the first experiment to include both 
the rules and the parameters that parallels the EU ETS structure. Marginal abatement 
costs, participants dimension and its environmental targets were defined to accomplish 
that. In addition, a penalty structure for incompliance, similar to the one prescribed at 
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the 2003/87/EC Directive, was introduced in our experimental treatments: a monetary 
penalty and the obligation to reduce, on the subsequent period, the excess emissions.  
Eyckmans et al. (2000) study was used to determine our marginal abatement 
costs structure and each participant’s abatement target has a relation with EU ETS 
agents. To assure laboratorial feasibility and respect budget restrictions we represented a 
proportional but small dimension market. Each experimental session included eight 
subjects representing one country of the EU-15: Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, 
Greece, Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom. This selection was due to the fact 
of being the most pollutant countries of EU-15 and those who received a greater share 
of CO2 emission permits. Its total emissions for the experiments were determined 
proportionally to the projections of those countries total emissions for 2010. CO2 
emission permits initial allocation was made accordingly to the EU Burden Sharing 
Agreement (BSA). Consequently, emission targets were more restrictive to some 
participants than others. 
The market represented was, therefore, characterised by imperfect competition: 
heterogeneous dimensions, marginal abatement costs and emission targets. 
Additionally, our experimental design included uncertainty on effective emission levels 
(or abatement), which means market agents do not have perfect information when 
deciding how to respect the environmental restriction they face and minimizing costs. 
Following Godby et al. (1997) procedures, we considered a random variation on 
emissions with values drawn from a uniform distribution (-1, 0, +1). To assure 
comparability of results we used the same uniform distribution for the different 
experimental sessions. This kind of uncertainty usually implies a high volatility on 
emission trading prices and the possibility of banking is one of the preferred solutions to 
the problem. Therefore, inclusion of this characteristic on our experimental treatments 
not only parallels EU ETS but also allows testing once again a theoretical solution 
usually recommended on these cases. 
Another innovation of our experimental design it was the use of a multiple price 
list (MPL) to induce subjects preferences over risk at the beginning of each session, 
similar to Holt and Laury (2002). Before participating at the laboratory market subjects 
were asked to take ten decisions about two forms of payment with different prizes. The 
objective was to compare the results of the individual choices on this part of the 
experimental session with their behaviour at the emission permits market (banking, or 
not, as a precautionary strategy).  
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To conduct computerized sessions, the experiments were programmed using 
zTree software (Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments, Fischbacher, 
(1999)). A pilot session was run in March 2008 and the four sessions effectively paid 
run with undergraduate students from Minho University (Braga, Portugal) on the two 
first weeks of November 2008. Recruitment was done through advertising on University 
campus and 32 students participated on the experiments: 4 sessions with 8 students 
each. Sessions took about two hours and a half, including reading of instructions, 
training and effective decision making. Students earnings ranged from 5,1€ to 28,34€, 
with an average payment of 15,83€ per student in the 4 sessions. This payments 
included a 5€ participation fee plus earnings related with the choice of payment form in 
the second part of the experiment (between 0,1€ and 3,85€) and earnings from the third 
part of the experiment – the emission permits market. These were calculated 
transforming the points made there at a conversion rate of 100 points = 1€. 
From the analysis of the experimental data collected with the MPL we classify 
the great majority of our participants averse to risk (a bigger percentage than the one 
reported by Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) or Harrison et al. (2005)). However, this 
classification does not result in a precautionary behavior at the emission permits market 
through retention of one title along all the experimental sessions.  
Prices on the 10 periods of each of the four sessions were generally above the 
benchmark prices and the opposite occurred with quantities. Consequently, total 
abatement costs were slightly above the minimum abatement costs but were clearly 
below the command-and-control reference. This means the laboratorial market 
implemented worked and total emission abatement costs were reduced in comparison 
with initial allocation. Even with a complex environment, that we tried to be similar to 
the EU ETS, these experimental sessions enlarge the arguments favoring the efficiency 
of emission permits markets. 
This was the first step of our investigation. We are now preparing to run other 
experimental sessions for a treatment with only one difference when comparing to those 
just presented: the initial allocation method. Instead of grandfathering the emission 
permits we are going to run an auction at the beginning of each period. The European 
Commission and its Member-States are currently discussing the use of auctioning as a 
rule for the initial allocation method in the next stages of the EU ETS. We hope to 
contribute to that discussion with the results of our next experiments. 
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